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Serve the Underserved in Several Countries 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Many countries have established public sector banks with the 
mission, among others, of serving the underserved. We are 
aware of eight countries that have specific legislation or 
government policies on the provision of services to 
underserved populations by private sector banks. There are 
likely to be other countries with mandates on the private sector 
that have escaped our attention. This report briefly describes 
the background of banking needs in each country and 
summarizes the history, and the current status, of each 
country’s legislation. 
 
From our U.S. experience, we know that community 
reinvestment legislation can significantly improve the provision 
of financial services and, hence, the economic health of lower-
income consumers and communities. We also know that such 
legislation attracts powerful opponents in the financial services 
industry. This brief report is a first step to invite collaboration 
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among countries that have such provisions, to 
share opportunities and challenges and to inform 
other countries of the benefits of such legislation. 
 
Woodstock Institute welcomes information about 
changes in the various laws and in their 
implementation in the countries listed, and 
information about similar policies in other 
countries. Please email any comments on this 
summary to tfeltner@woodstockinst.org. 
 
 
Australia 
 
Introduction 
 
The Australian financial services sector has 
recently undergone a series of structural changes, 
effectively limiting the access to basic financial 
services for low-income and rural communities. 
Developments in the delivery of financial 
services, such as automated and internet-based 
banking, as well as a series of high profile bank 
mergers have led to the overall reduction in bank 
branches that serve these types of areas. 
Researchers studying the issue have found that 
the loss of access to a bank account or the 
inability to open a bank account is a primary 
barrier to economic progress in Australia, 
making a strong case for the continued study and 
regulation of financial service providers and their 
ability to maintain and improve access to these 
services in low-income and rural areas. 
 
 
Investigations of Financial Exclusion 
 
• In 1999, the Australian House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance, and Public Admin-
istration released a report documenting the 
loss of banking services in low-income and 
rural areas. The report is the culmination of 
ongoing discussions with the banking 
industry to develop a series of recom-
mendations on expanding access to financial 
services in these areas and developing 
alternative delivery mechanisms. 
 
• In 2001, the Financial Services Consumer 
Policy Centre at the University of New South 
Wales Chifley Research Centre followed up 
the Committee’s report with a comprehensive 
analysis on the state of social exclusion in 
Australia. The report found that financial 
exclusion was primarily caused by the high 
cost of service provision and the barriers to 
access for certain income and minority 
groups. The center recommended the 
creation of a Social Banking Charter that 
would spell out regulatory obligations to 
investigate financial exclusion, set up a 
branch closure protocol, promote alternative 
delivery of services, and issue standards for 
the provision of basic bank account. 
 
• Taking these recommendations under 
consideration, the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority began requiring bank 
branch distribution data from all authorized 
deposit-taking institutions in 2002. The 
publicly available data updated annually and 
lists the type of branch, the services 
provided, and whether or not the branch 
serves a rural or metropolitan area. 
 
 
Banking Industry Opposes Regulation 
 
• The Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) 
committed to organize a Working Group to 
address each of the reports recommenda-
tions, particularly the issue of regional and 
rural service provision. The ABA noted that 
at least four of Australia’s largest banks have 
placed a moratorium on bank branch closings 
in rural areas and stated that, with a few 
exceptions, nearly all Australians currently 
have access to a bank branch within 20 
kilometers from their communities. Taking 
these factors into consideration, the ABA 
opposes any additional regulation or govern-
ment imposed Social Charter, such as a US-
styled Community Reinvestment Act. 
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Brazil 
 
Introduction 
 
Currently, only one-third of Brazilians have 
access to a bank account. Identification 
procedures for opening an account are a major 
barrier. Almost 30 percent of municipalities, 
over 1,600, lack basic banking facilities, and 
another 1,400 have only one bank branch.  
Public policy to expand access to financial 
services relies heavily on large public banks. A 
World Bank report asserted that given their non-
depositary status, the regulatory burden on 
microfinance institutions is too high, and that 
credit cooperatives suffer from high leverage and 
liquidity constraints. The same report adds that 
very expensive public financing often fails to 
reach target groups.   
 
 
 
 
Recent Legislative Responses 
 
• Four community reinvestment laws were 
enacted in 2003. The first granted the 
National Monetary Board the authority to 
regulate microfinance operations operated by 
financial institutions. These institutions in-
clude commercial banks, financial services 
firms, and credit cooperatives. The second 
piece required all financial institutions to set 
aside 2 percent of all demand deposits for 
microfinance operations. The third measure 
provides access to low-cost bank accounts, 
and the fourth expands the eligibility of 
credit cooperative membership. 
 
• The 2 percent set aside measure is expected 
to generate R$1.1 billion, or US$330 million 
annually. These funds are targeted specifical-
ly to small business, though not necessarily 
businesses owned by low-income people. 
Terms and conditions include 2 percent 
interest per month, with a minimum principal 
of R$600, and a minimum term of 120 days. 
While five financial institutions have im-
plemented this requirement, we are currently 
unaware of any regulatory enforcement 
procedures for banks that are not in 
compliance. 
 
• The current president, Luiz Ińacio da Silva 
(Lula), has appointed supporters of micro-
finance and cooperative credit to key govern-
ment positions, enabling the passage of this 
legislation. Many banking industry leaders 
criticize the law as credit allocation which 
they regard as unprofitable. They also regard 
subsidized interest rates as impractical in the 
long run. 
 
• Banks must now offer simplified, low-cost 
bank accounts to low-income customers. 
Accounts do not carry maintenance fees 
unless the accountholder exceeds four 
deposits or withdrawals each month. Low-
income status is determined by the account 
balance, not by annual income, so 
accountholders cannot deposit more than 
R$1,000 in any given month.   
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• Credit Cooperative membership has been 
extended to any municipality with less than 
100,000 residents, or approximately 95 
percent of the countries municipalities. (Most 
of the population, however, lives in large 
urban areas.) Asset requirements are set at 
R$6 million for credit cooperatives in 
metropolitan areas, and R$3 million in rural 
areas. Specially designated high need areas 
may have lower asset requirements. We are 
currently unaware of the regulatory structure 
regarding credit cooperatives. 
 
• There is currently no enacted or pending 
legislation that requires the disclosure or 
monitoring of a bank’s lending performance, 
making enforcement difficult. 
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Canada  
 
Introduction 
 
Canada is a relatively small country in terms of 
population, but it includes a number of large and 
diverse financial service providers. In recent 
years, many consumer groups have questioned 
whether or not these financial institutions have 
been responsive to the needs of low-income or 
underserved Canadian consumers. However, 
under Canadian law, the legislation that governs 
federally regulated financial institutions is subject 
to review every five years. This review provides 
legislators and community activists the oppor-
tunity to comment on provisions that limit the 
growth of the financial services sector or 
negatively impact underserved communities. In 
1996, legislators and regulators found that 
dramatic changes within the financial services 
sector were underway. Many of these changes 
directly altered the type of basic financial 
products offered and the manner in which basic 
financial services were delivered. 
 
• Canadian financial services legislation has 
taken a passive approach to expanding 
access, enacting voluntary measures, and 
depending on financial institutions to self-
regulate their service operations. Most of 
these voluntary measures were enacted as 
part of a comprehensive financial moderniza-
tion movement beginning in the mid-1990s. 
 
• By law, the legislation governing Canada’s 
federally regulated financial institutions must 
be reviewed every five years. By 1996, 
Canada’s financial services sector was 
undergoing rapid change, much like the 
financial services sector in the United States. 
To address these changes and to propose an 
effective modernization framework during 
the next legislative review, a task force was 
commissioned to draft recommendations for 
the future of the financial services sector. 
 
• The task force presented its findings and over 
124 specific recommendations in a report 
issued by the Department of Finance in 1999. 
The major findings stated that new regulation 
should be designed to enhance compete-
tiveness, empower consumers, strengthen the 
relationship between financial institutions and 
the communities they serve, and make the 
current regulatory framework flexible to 
promote safety, soundness, and innovation. 
 
 
Enacted Community Reinvestment Measures 
 
• Draft legislation was introduced in 2000 as 
Bill C-38 (titled An Act to Establish the 
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, and 
to Amend Certain Acts in Relation to 
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Financial Institutions) based on the recom-
mendations of the task force. This bill was 
not acted upon and was eventually derailed 
by the 2000 federal elections. The bill was 
reintroduced as Bill C-8 (titled An Act to 
Establish the Financial Consumer Agency of 
Canada, and to Amend Certain Acts in 
Relation to Financial Institutions) in 2001 
with minor changes and was passed by the 
Canadian Parliament later that year. The 
enacted legislation contains a number of 
important, although voluntary community 
reinvestment measures. 
 
• C-8 created the Financial Consumer Agency 
of Canada (FCAC) under the Ministry of 
Finance and funded by the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund paid into by all financial 
institutions (similar to the U.S. Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency). This agency is 
responsible for reviewing an institution’s 
voluntary consumer protection codes. These 
voluntary consumer protection codes are 
“non-regulatory” agreements that usually 
pertain to account term disputes and are not 
enforceable by FCAC. Financial institutions 
are also required to file a report describing 
their consumer complaints procedures. All of 
these disclosures would be made to the 
regulatory agency only, and would not be 
available for public review. Violations, as 
determined by the agency, would trigger 
fines of up to $100,000.  
 
• All federally regulated financial institutions 
are now required to give public notice of 
branch closings. While the FCAC would not 
have the authority to prescribe branch 
distribution requirements, three months’ 
notice is now required for all branch 
closings. Branch closings in underserved 
areas require six months’ notice. 
 
• Under C-8, the FCAC was also granted the 
authority to set up an independent inter-
mediary organization to handle consumer 
banking complaint issues. Instead of creating 
a new organization, the Canadian Banking 
Ombudsmen, which had handled banking 
disputes since 1996, was merged with the 
consumer complaint office under develop-
ment by the banking industry. Now called 
the Ombudsman for Banking Services and 
Investments, the office makes recommenda-
tions on about 200 cases involving deposit-
taking institutions each year. 
 
• C-8 was criticized by the Canadian 
Community Reinvestment Coalition for not 
enacting mandatory requirements for low-
cost bank accounts, providing subsidies for 
bank branches in underserved communities, 
or providing an independent consumer 
complaint board to resolve disputes. Most 
importantly, the new regulations did not 
require the disclosure of mortgage lending 
data. 
 
• The Minister of Finance and the financial 
institutions also produced a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 2001, describing the 
availability of low cost bank accounts. Eight 
of Canada’s 16 largest banks signed this 
initial agreement, agreeing to offer low-fee 
accounts with no minimum balance or 
deposit. In 2003, all of the original banks 
renewed their agreement to provide low-cost 
accounts. The government is committed to 
monitor these targets, but believes that it 
should encourage a self-regulatory approach 
and not set national standards. 
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India 
 
Introduction 
 
Rural India has historically lacked the financial 
services commonly available in urban areas, 
making the problem of indebtedness and seasonal 
cash-flow shortages associated with agriculture 
one of the most pervasive features of rural Indian 
life. These areas have suffered from an 
inadequate supply of formal sector credit, 
imperfect and fragmented rural credit markets, 
inequitable distribution of credit based on caste, 
class, region or gender, and the high cost of 
informal sector loans. From 1969 to 1990, the 
government of India attempted to alleviate some 
of these issues by nationalizing India’s banking 
system. 
 
Government Regulation 1969-1990 
 
• The Bank Company Acquisition Act of 1969 
effectively nationalized India’s banking 
system and imposed a strong social mandate 
on 14 of India’s largest commercial banks. 
 
The Banking system touches the lives of 
millions and has to be inspired by a larger 
social purpose and has to subserve 
national priorities and objectives such as 
rapid growth of agriculture, small 
industries and exports, raising of employ-
ment levels, encouragement of new 
entrepreneurs, and development of back-
ward areas. For this purpose, it is 
necessary for the government to take 
direct responsibility for the extension and 
diversification of banking services and for 
the working of a substantial part of the 
banking system. 
 
• Under the authority of the 1949 Banking 
Regulation Act, banks wishing to expand or 
establish new branches had to receive 
approval from the Indian Central Bank. In 
1977, the Central Bank stipulated that no 
new branch applications would be approved 
for banks in developed areas unless four 
branches were constructed in undeveloped 
areas. Branch data from this period shows 
that the four to one rule was strictly 
enforced. 
 
• Access to credit in rural areas also increased 
during the nationalization of India’s financial 
sector. The proportion of credit dispersed in 
India’s rural areas tripled in the 1970’s and 
continued to increase in 1980. 
 
 
Deregulation 1990 to Present 
 
• The Indian banking system was liberalized in 
1990 and the four to one rule governing bank 
branch expansion and other credit provisions 
were eliminated. As a result, 1990 marked 
the high point in rural deposits, credit 
provision, rural bank branch offices, and 
rural credit-deposit ratios, all of which have 
declined significantly since deregulation. 
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Nigeria 
 
Introduction 
 
Access to affordable and effective financial 
products remain out of reach to most Nigerians, 
despite the active role the Central Bank played in 
promoting rural branches and cooperative banks. 
Since the Central Bank’s nationalization in 1969, 
conflicting bank policies have tried to promote 
new types of banking services, while at the same 
time placing stringent restrictions on others. For 
traditional checking and savings accounts, 
minimum account balances remained so high that 
individuals were unable to access basic 
transaction accounts. Combined with the nation-
wide tendency to prefer cash for day-to-day 
transactions and the rapid inflation of the 1980’s, 
many Nigerians did not view banks as an 
effective player in their commercial activities. In 
addition, Nigerian and foreign owned banks were 
limited in their ability to provide affordable 
financial services. As the Central Bank gradually 
deregulated the banking industry beginning in 
1986, the few commercial banks in rural areas 
began to close as banks no longer supported 
unprofitable branches, even as the total number 
of commercial banks in the country doubled. 
While deregulation made commercial accounts 
inaccessible to most Nigerians, the Nigerian 
Central Bank began to pursue other financial 
services delivery methods, such as mutual 
savings and loan association. 
 
For many Nigerians, access to even a small 
amount of credit can make a considerable 
difference in their ability to earn a self-reliant 
income. Throughout the process of financial 
deregulation and modernization, the government 
and Central Bank of Nigeria have developed a 
number of financial services provisions to target 
these small scale industries and local operators to 
encourage self-sufficiency and promote main-
stream financial transactions. 
 
• Until 1998, the Nigerian Central Bank 
limited the ability of foreign and domestic 
commercial banks to open checking or 
savings accounts for individual depositors. 
Commercial accounts were required to 
maintain balances of N50,000, or about 
US$370, limiting their customer base. 
 
• In 1988, the Nigerian banking system 
consisted of the Nigerian Central Bank, 42 
commercial banks and 24 merchant banks, 
with a total of 1,000 branches. Most of these 
branches were located in major urban areas, 
limiting rural and low-income areas’ access 
to the private market financial mainstream. 
 
 
Initial Government Responses to Lack of 
Banking Services 
 
• Community development finance issues in 
Nigeria primarily stem from policy decisions 
made by the Nigerian Central Bank. 
 
• The Rural Banking Scheme was developed 
by the Central Bank in 1977 with the goal of 
achieving one bank branch in each of 
Nigeria’s 774 Local Government Areas. This 
goal was met in 1991. Each of these 
branches serves about 127,000 people.   
 
• The People’s Bank was established in 1989 
to provide access to credit for low-income 
families, farmers, and craftsmen. This 
community development finance initiative 
was relatively unsuccessful and was criticized 
as being too dependent on government 
subsidies. The initiative was unable to 
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recover many of its loans and was facing 
severe decapitalization when it was replaced 
by the Community Banks Program in 1990. 
 
 
The Invention of Community Banks 
 
• Community banks were designed around the 
informal mutual savings and loan 
associations operating in rural areas. 
Organized by the government sponsored 
National Board of Community Banks 
(NBCB), these financial institutions are 
meant to be self-sustaining and managed by 
communities to provide credit and deposit 
banking facilities. The NBCB is responsible 
for chartering and examining the Com-
munity banks for sound operation.  
 
• Community banks have been successful in 
providing financial services to those people 
most likely to be left out of the financial 
mainstream. These banks use the strong local 
networks present in many rural areas of 
Nigeria and community bank boards are 
generally drawn from respected leaders 
within the community. 
 
• However, community banks have a number 
of shortcomings. The instability in the com-
mercial banking system, in which many 
community banks place their funds, has had a 
chilling effect on community banks capacity 
to lend. In order to maintain sound opera-
tions they have only been able to make short-
term investments, limiting the wealth 
creation potential of their members. In ad-
dition, community banks have had limited 
success in urban areas, where the general 
sense of community ownership is not as 
strong. 
 
 
Small Business Lending-The Small and Medium 
Industries Equity Investment Scheme 
 
• Urban areas, however, have benefited from 
the Small and Medium Industries Equity 
Investment Scheme (SMIEIS). This volun-
tary scheme developed by the Banker’s 
Committee at the request of Nigerian 
President Obasanjo, was designed to replace 
many of the unsuccessful government small 
business development programs. 
 
• Beginning in 2001, all Nigerian banks are 
required to set aside 10 percent of their 
before-tax profits and invest these funds in 
small and medium enterprises. Qualified 
businesses must have less than N200 million 
in assets and between 10 and 300 employees. 
Investments have a term limit of three years. 
 
• Between 2001 and 2003, the SMIEIS set 
aside N13.07 billion (US$98.3 million), of 
which only N2.87 billion (US$21.6 million) 
has been invested in qualified projects. 
Nearly all of these projects were in the 
service sector, and nearly all of them located 
in urban areas. Given the overall lack of 
interest in the SMIEIS, banks have been slow 
to respond to demands for increased 
investments and simply set aside the required 
amount on their balance sheets without 
pursuing qualified investments in good faith. 
The Central Bank has taken a leading role in 
encouraging future SMIEIS participation.  
 
• Going forward, both the Nigerian Central 
Bank and the Banker’s Committee have 
suggested mechanisms for improving the 
investment rate of the SMIEIS program. 
However, limiting the percentage of invest-
ments going to the service sector and 
requiring investments in certain NGO’s has 
not proved effective. 
 
 
References 
 
Akabueze, Ben. “The Small and Medium 
Industries Equity Investment Scheme 
(SMIEIS): Status Report from the Banking 
Sector.” (paper presented at E-Week 2002 
Seminar, Lagos, Nigeria, 11-14 February 
2002). 
 
Aminu, Ayodele. SMIEIS Committee Moves to 
Accelerate Implementation, (27 July 2003).  
<www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2003/02/2
August 2004                                                                                                     Woodstock Institute 
Page  9 
7/20030227mog01.html> (4 February 
2004). 
 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Central Bank of 
Nigeria. Brief on the Small and Medium 
Scale Industries Equity Investment Scheme, 
(30 October 2002) <www.cenbank.org/ 
devfin/smieis.htm> (4 February 2004). 
 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Central Bank of 
Nigeria. List of Banks’ Investments in 
Projects Under SMIEIS, (31 December 2003) 
<http://www.cenbank.org/PDF/ 
SMIEIS2003(3).pdf> (15 May 2004). 
 
Library of Congress. Nigeria Banking and 
Finance, (1998). <countrystudies.us/ 
Nigeria/66.htm> (4 February 2004). 
 
Nigeria Business Info. Small and Medium Scale 
Enterprises and Funding in Nigeria, (25 
August 2003). <www.nigeriabusinessinfo. 
com/smieis250803.htm> (4 February 2004). 
 
Yunusa, Miriam Ladi. The Community Banking 
System in Nigeria, (1998) <http://unpan1. 
un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ID
EP/UNPAN004228.pdf> (14 May 2004). 
 
 
South Africa 
  
Introduction 
 
• The formal dismantling of apartheid in 1994 
left a sophisticated banking system operating 
for the benefit of the white minority within 
an otherwise third world economy. The new 
Government of National Unity inherited a 
housing finance system that was inherently 
fragmented and unstable. Nationwide, the 
housing sector lacked the experience or 
capacity to provide adequate housing to the 
entire country on equitable terms, and 
inefficient building codes, insufficient land, 
and an overall lack of end user finance 
limited the sectors ability to remedy this 
situation on its own. In addition, the growing 
threat of AIDS has made long-term housing 
and community development lending risky 
and potentially unprofitable. 
 
• These conditions and other uncertainties in 
the South African economy during the 1990s 
exacerbated many long standing housing and 
community reinvestment trends. Redlining in 
township areas, home to residents who are 
overwhelmingly poor and Black, became 
apparent. Financial institutions refused to 
lend in areas where due process had broken 
down and poor law enforcement made 
repossession of real estate expensive or 
unlikely. Most financial services, particularly 
access to mortgage capital and insurance 
remain out of reach for most black South 
Africans. Recent estimates put the number of 
South African unbanked at over 13 million 
out of a population of 44.9 million or about 
29 percent. 
 
 
First Government Steps at Providing Housing 
Credit 
 
• In 1994, the new government of South 
Africa, the South African business sector, 
and representatives from local communities 
agreed to a new set of housing principles 
known as the National Housing Accord. 
Following these meetings, a series of 
recommendations known as the Housing 
White Paper was drafted, setting the frame-
work for future housing policy. Based on this 
document, the National Housing Code Act 
was drafted as a blueprint for all future 
national housing activities. This Act passed 
in 1997 as Act No. 107(1997). The National 
Housing Code replaced all previously 
adopted housing initiatives and addressed the 
country’s fragmented housing policy and lack 
of end-user finance for low-income South 
Africans. 
 
• In order to expand the access to credit for 
low-income South Africans in accordance 
with the National Housing Code, the South 
African Association of Mortgage Lenders, 
and the Ministry of Housing entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding in 1994. 
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This agreement recognized the need for new 
investment in credit-starved areas, while at 
the same time recognizing the need to reduce 
the substantial risk to South African 
mortgage lenders. 
 
• The New Deal, issued in 1998, aligned the 
agreements laid out in the Record of 
Understanding and the changes in the 
housing market brought about by the 
National Housing Code. The New Deal 
expressed the joint responsibility of the 
government to stabilize housing market and 
the banking industry to begin providing 
capital in areas that had been previously 
denied. 
 
 
Disclosure Law 
 
• The government passed the Home Loan and 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HLMDA) of 2000 
in order to document the ability of financial 
institutions to serve their communities. This 
Act stated that all citizens have equal 
protection from discrimination and that all 
levels of government are responsible for 
ensuring that discrimination does not exist in 
the provision of credit in the housing market. 
 
• The HLMDA clearly states that institutions 
are only required to disclose real estate-
secured mortgage information and are not 
required to ration credit or make loans in an 
unsafe or unsound manner.   
 
• The Act also creates the Office of Disclosure 
consisting of ten members experienced in 
banking, housing finance, community 
economics, and civil rights to oversee the 
execution of the act. The Office is charged 
with receiving and analyzing home loan data, 
making this data publicly available, and 
receiving and investigating public comments. 
Using this information, the office assists 
other regulatory agencies in enforcing com-
pliance with antidiscrimination legislation 
and provides annual compliance reports on 
all financial institutions to the Minister of 
Housing. 
• The HLMDA is similar to HMDA in the 
United States. Data disclosed include: 
 
o Count and amount of closed home loans 
o Category of borrower 
o Geographic area 
o Count and amount of declined home loan 
applications 
o Reason for application rejection 
 
 
Debate About Community Reinvestment 
Legislation 
 
• CRA-style legislation is currently under 
consideration. In 2002, the Community 
Reinvestment (Housing) Bill was introduced 
in Parliament to hold financial institutions 
accountable for any discriminatory practices 
indicated by their HLMDA disclosures and 
contribute to the availability of credit to low-
income borrowers and low-income areas. 
Such legislation would define the response-
bilities of mortgage lenders, set lending 
goals, and provide opportunities to remedy 
shortcomings in these goals. However, the 
bill was strongly opposed by the Banking 
Council, the trade association representing 
the South African financial services industry.  
  
• The Banking Council argues that CRA-style 
legislation is impractical in South Africa 
because so few residents own their homes 
and the breakdown in due process in many 
rural areas limits banks’ ability to repossess 
collateral. In addition, because of lenient 
underwriting as a result of the goals 
established by the Record of Understanding, 
nearly 33,000 properties were repossessed by 
2001, with many more losing up to 20 
percent of their value, placing many low-
income borrowers in a negative equity 
situation. 
 
• Representatives from banking, pension fund, 
insurance, and investment organizations 
committed to a voluntary Financial Sector 
Charter in 2002. This charter set benchmarks 
for the provision of affordable banking 
services to Black South Africans. These 
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goals include access to transaction products, 
savings products, long- and short-term 
insurance, and investments but do not set 
specific goals for serving low-income 
individuals or communities. 
 
• Many alternatives to US-styled CRA 
legislation have been proposed. 
 
o Set affordable housing goals for second-
dary market (similar to the housing goals 
set up under the FHEFSSA) 
 
o Pursue rental and cooperative housing 
that many experts argue is more suitable 
to South African housing and finance 
situations. 
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United Kingdom 
 
Introduction 
 
Roughly 2.5-3.5 million Britons do not have a 
traditional bank account. A government study 
suggests that banks are not refusing services to 
disadvantaged communities outright; instead 
banks simply do not offer the unbanked 
appropriate services to fit their needs. There is 
also a problem of insurance redlining, 
particularly in the case of council housing 
(publicly-owned housing) residents. Many 
residents do not have the appropriate financial 
literacy to purchase homeowner’s or life 
insurance or simply can not afford the premiums.   
 
 
Government Action 
 
• In order to improve access to financial 
services and expand access to credit, the 
incoming Labor Party government estab-
lished the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) in 
1997. The SEU was organized into a number 
of Policy Action Teams, with financial 
exclusion assigned to Policy Action Team 
14. PAT14 drafted a number of recom-
mendations for expanding access to credit, 
long-term and home content insurance, and 
banking facilities. These recommendations 
were taken under consideration by the 
Financial Services Authority and HM 
Treasury. 
 
• The Policy Action Team provided similar 
responses for nearly every area of financial 
exclusion. The team clearly stated that any 
statutory or regulatory action taken should 
increase competition and consumer choice. 
Recommendations were careful to minimize 
public sector intervention and avoid the 
appearance of credit rationing. 
 
• The task force stressed the need for banks to 
voluntarily expand their low-cost bank 
account program. They also recommended 
using the post office system as an accessible 
location for banking services. No legislation 
addressing any of these suggestions has been 
introduced. The task force also recommended 
that banks voluntarily disclose the geographic 
distribution of their checking and savings 
account to highlight any possible discrimina-
tion. 
 
• The task force suggested setting up an 
“insurance with rent” scheme targeted to 
council housing residents. This type of 
scheme would utilize collective rates for the 
entire building to lower costs and allow 
residents to pay rent and insurance at the 
same time, reducing transaction costs. No 
legislation addressing any of these sug-
gestions has been introduced. 
 
• PAT14 suggested that credit unions serve as 
alternative credit providers in cases where 
banks are not adequately serving the market. 
By merging community and employers based 
fields of membership and streamlining capital 
requirements, the task force believes that 
credit unions could effectively serve as micro 
loan providers for low-income and small 
business. No legislation addressing any of 
these suggestions has been introduced. 
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United States 
 
Introduction 
 
Early in the 1970s, community groups and later 
research institutes began to report the 
phenomenon of redlining; banks and insurance 
companies refusing to operate in racially 
minority and low-income neighborhoods. As a 
result of community activist pressure, in 1975 
Congress passed the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA), followed in 1977 with the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). CRA, 
which provides that regulated financial institu-
tions have a continuing and affirmative 
responsibility to try to meet the credit needs of 
the communities in their service areas (now 
assessment areas) including low- and moderate-
income communities, was only weakly enforced 
in the 1980s.   
 
Better enforcement of the law in the 1990s was 
the result of amendments to HMDA in 1989 the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) which added new 
data disclosures, the advent of the Clinton 
presidency in 1992, and new CRA regulations in 
1996 which emphasized CRA outcomes over 
processes. More recently, however, the admin-
istration of President Bush has massively reduced 
emphasis on regulation in general. Bush 
appointments to bank regulatory agencies are 
actively hostile to the CRA. In addition, new 
mortgage and consumer lenders, often operating 
in low-income and minority communities, have 
engaged in predatory lending--extending loans 
with excessive interest rates and fees, and 
damaging terms and conditions that have resulted 
in very high levels of default of home mortgage 
loans, home foreclosures, and deepening spirals 
of debt for many consumers. Moreover, an 
increasing percent of assets in the financial 
services sector are in institutions not covered by 
CRA legislation, especially independent mort-
gage companies and the subsidiaries of bank 
holding companies that are not subsidiaries of 
regulated banks. 
  
Major research studies from such institutions as 
the Federal Reserve Board and the Joint Center 
for Housing Studies at Harvard University have 
shown that the CRA in the 1990s significantly 
increased home mortgage lending in lower-
income and minority communities and that the 
bulk of both CRA related home mortgage lending 
and small business lending is profitable for the 
lending institutions.   
 
 
Details of Federal Legislation 
 
• The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) requires financial institutions to 
submit data containing the race, income, 
gender, and approval status of the applicants 
for home mortgage loans, along with the 
income and minority composition of the 
community in which the loan is made. Since 
1996, banks have been required to submit 
similar, though less comprehensive, informa-
tion on their small business lending. These 
data are publicly available. Starting January, 
2004, regulated financial institutions will also 
have to provide the annual percentage 
interest rates on all high interest home 
mortgage loans, loans with interest rates at or 
above 3 percent of U.S. Treasury Notes with 
corresponding terms. This new requirement 
is intended to help combat predatory mort-
gage lending. 
 
• The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 
building on the disclosure requirements of 
HMDA, states that banks have a continuing 
and affirmative obligation to help meet the 
credit needs of their communities. Using the 
data to analyze lending patterns in a bank’s 
primary services areas, or assessment areas, 
the bank’s federal regulator provides a 
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periodic report of the bank’s lending activity. 
In addition to lending, banks are evaluated on 
their grants and investment activity, and the 
provision of bank services including the 
presence of branches in low- and moderate- 
communities. Banks are assigned a grade of 
Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, 
or Substantial Non-Compliance based on 
their lending, investments, and service 
evaluations. In cases where a bank receives a 
score of Needs to Improve or Substantial 
Non-Compliance, federal regulators may 
deny the banks’ applications to expand its 
operations or merge with another bank. 
Some of the information and conclusions 
from these examinations are published in the 
bank’s Public Evaluation or PE.   
 
• CRA has faced numerous political challenges 
since its enactment from elected officials who 
are favorable to, and receive election 
campaign funds from, the financial services 
industry. Most important, bank regulators 
have refused to recognize contemporary 
modes of banking in determining what 
constitutes a bank for CRA regulatory 
purposes. In consequence, much of the 
banking activity of credit card companies, 
insurance companies, and internet banks is 
not CRA regulated. While regulators have 
greatly expanded the scope of CRA public 
evaluations, however, they have rarely 
blocked a bank expansion or merger on CRA 
grounds. Ninety-seven percent of examined 
banks receive a satisfactory rating or 
outstanding CRA rating.   
 
• Bank regulators have interpreted the CRA as 
lacking explicit powers for the examination 
of banks’ record to minorities and in 
minority communities. Community groups 
have challenged this interpretation on 
numerous occasions arguing that the strong 
relationship between income and race in the 
United States and patterns of massive 
housing segregation by race, justify the 
examination of a bank’s record of services to 
minority households and populations. 
Currently, discrimination on the basis of race 
is only briefly cited in CRA public 
evaluations and only in the context of the 
Fair Lending Act. This act protects indivi-
dual minority borrowers from discrimination 
but does not require a bank to provide 
banking services to minority communities. 
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Conclusion 
 
Community reinvestment legislation and govern-
ment strategy, both in the United States and in 
other countries, are concerned with the direct or 
indirect provision of low-cost and accessible 
financial services, access to mortgage, small 
business and consumer credit, and the financial 
services disclosure requirements by private 
financial institutions. The central tenant of com-
munity reinvestment mandates is that financial 
services are central to the well-being of 
disadvantaged populations and communities and 
that private financial institutions have some 
responsibility to provide these services in return 
for their privileged status. Just as banks are 
permitted to accept deposits throughout a 
community, governments have tried to mandate 
or persuade banking industry to provide a basic 
level of services in return. However, the banking 
climate and the definition of what constitutes a 
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basic level of service vary widely from country 
to country. 
 
International comparisons of community re-
investment legislation and government strategies 
suggest three substantive areas of consideration: 
community mandates on the banking industry 
during and after the nationalization of private 
institutions, the deregulation and privatization of 
the banking industry and the resulting mandatory 
community provisions loosely based on the US-
style CRA, and the voluntary social charters in 
situations where the banking industry has 
managed to avoid a mandate.  Parallel, but not 
always related to these general currents of 
community reinvestment activity is the wide-
spread consideration and adaptation of the 
community-based credit cooperative as a means 
to deliver services and provide credit to 
underserved populations or communities. 
 
The success or failure of community reinvest-
ment legislation and government strategies rests 
on the ability of the regulatory unit of 
government to measure and enforce mandates or 
encourage participation in voluntary strategies. 
Bank branch expansion initiatives in Nigeria and 
India have proven successful in mandating 
financial service provision in areas that have 
been traditionally underserved. However, other 
types of mandates in which there is not a strong 
regulatory component have not lived up to initial 
expectations. This is currently the case in Nigeria 
where the requirements to set aside private 
capital for small business loans are observed but 
the enforcement of actual investment in under-
served small businesses has been lacking. 
Disclosure requirements also present a new set of 
challenges. Nearly all financial institutions have 
shown relative hostility to a new layer of 
regulation. They have also shown a lack of con-
sensus over what data should be collected and 
how it should be released to the public. South 
Africa has been successful in passing a home 
mortgage disclosure law based on the U.S. Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act, and Australia now 
requires banks to disclose the distribution of bank 
branches. However, disclosure requirements for 
mortgages in Canada and bank accounts in the 
United Kingdom have been unable to attract 
broad-based support necessary for passage and 
implementation. Mandatory disclosure of home 
mortgage and small business loans in the U.S. is 
vital to the implementation of the Community 
Reinvestment Act. 
 
Community reinvestment legislation is some-
times criticized for constituting interference in 
the market. The counter to that criticism is that 
financial services markets are not working for 
many low-income people and communities, and 
that the industry itself constantly promotes 
regulation that increases the competitive 
advantage of established companies. Moreover, 
in a market economy, access to capital and credit 
on fair and equal terms is essential for full 
participation in that market. 
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Woodstock Institute, a Chicago nonprofit in-
corporated in 1973, works locally and nationally 
to promote sound community reinvestment and 
economic development in lower-income and 
minority communities. It collaborates with com-
munity organizations, financial institutions, 
foundations, government agencies, and others to 
promote its goals. 
 
The Institute engages in applied research, policy 
analysis, technical assistance, public education, 
and program design and evaluation. Its areas of 
expertise include: CRA and fair lending policies, 
financial and insurance services, small business 
lending, community development financial in-
stitutions, and economic development strategies. 
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